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I. INTRODUCTION
a. Spanish-American Trade Relations
Spanish-American trade relations during the American Revolution set the stage for the
trading relationship between James Barry and Spanish firm Manella, Pujals & Co. (“Manella”) at
issue in Manella v. Barry. 1 The Spanish empire at this time was the fourth largest empire in
history, and the restrictive economic policies of the crown existed to preserve and later regain
that status. 2 Because of its geographic proximity, Cuba was an attractive and convenient trading
partner for American merchants, and was the initial Spanish-American trading venue. Flour was
the primary import into Cuba from the Thirteen Colonies, and Spain could not adequately supply
the need for flour in Cuba because of problems with transportation and high demand from the
other Spanish colonies. 3 During the American Revolution, Spanish ships supplying Havana
could not be assured safe passage because of vulnerability to privateers between Cuba and
Europe, so the Spanish crown had to allow America to trade with Cuba and nearby colonies for
flour and other needs. In 1780, the first American ships delivered goods to Cuba, and imports
grew from 1780 to 1783. 4
Spain controlled imports to the colonies through a policy of exclusivism, but could not
meet the colonies’ demand for goods during wartime, in part because of losses at the hands of
English and French privateers. 5 The crown was so staunch in its mercantilist economic policy
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that rather than relax import regulations when demand from the colonies peaked in the 1790s,
Spain issued debt and levied taxes to fund government operations during wartime. 6
Spain’s import policy also created a corrupt trading climate rife with unfair competition
between domestic merchants. The crown’s mercantilistic policies benefitted larger merchants.
and smaller merchants could not offer competitive prices under the crown’s high taxes. This led
smaller merchants to trade illegally outside of the royal monopoly, usually with foreign
merchants. 7 Thus, during the period from 1793 to 1799, American exports to Spanish America
rose steadily and peaked at $8.9 million, accounting for thirty-five percent of U.S. Exports. 8
This environment of domestic merchants evading government regulation through
clandestine trade practices characterized the tobacco industry in particular. The Spanish crown
used a royal monopoly to regulate the tobacco industry. In the 1770s, the most popular type of
tobacco in Spain, a variety called cura seca, was produced in Venezuela. 9 In 1777, the Spanish
crown established a monopoly for Venezuelan tobacco, controlling the amount grown and
mandating that the entire crop be sold to the royal monopoly. 10 The tobacco monopoly
accounted for twenty percent of the King’s revenue, and illustrates the crown’s significant
dependence on the colonies as a source of income. 11 Any surplus tobacco was marketed for sale
by the monopoly to North American merchants who had previously been allowed trading
privileges. 12 These merchants would sell the tobacco domestically or export it to foreign
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1996).
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countries such as Holland. 13 Eventually there came to be a tobacco surplus in Venezuela, and in
1796, the tobacco monopoly attempted to sell tobacco to neutral non-American merchants in
exchange for trading rights with Spain. 14 These efforts were unsuccessful, so the monopoly
looked to the United States for potential sales opportunities, finding great success until 1799
when the crown closed all trade with foreign neutrals. 15
b. The Role of Spanish Consuls
Upon the signing of a treaty negotiated by Thomas Pinkney in 1795, Spain began sending
consuls to the United States. 16 By the end of that year, Spain had consuls in eight major
American cities. 17 The crown employed merchants as Spanish consuls because merchants had
already built trading and social networks with United States merchants, so they had a foundation
from which to build ongoing business relationships. 18 The consuls in Cadíz and America forged
business relationships on behalf of the crown because they were able to identify merchants on
both shores who were willing to buy and sell goods on consignment. 19 These consignment
relationships were lucrative for both parties, as evidenced by the records of John Stoughton (c.
1745–1820). 20
As Spanish consul for New England from 1795–1820, Stoughton brokered relationships
between at least thirty-six Spanish merchants, including Bernardo Lacosta, who was involved in
Manella v. Barry. 21 Stoughton’s son in law, José de Jáudenes, named Stoughton to his position
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as Spanish consul to the United States from 1791 – 1795. 22 Jáudenes’ successor was the
Marqués de Casa Irujo, business associate of James Barry. 23 Thus, it is likely that Stoughton and
Barry were business associates in the Spanish-American trade networks, though it was Bishop
John Carroll who first introduced Barry to Jáudenes and Irujo. 24
Merchants initially shipped goods to Cuba through permits controlled by Spanish consuls
which required the payment of fees of up to one third the cost of the commodities being traded. 25
When Spain reentered the war in 1796, trade policies shifted from a permit system to a
monopoly system, but existing relationships between consuls and merchants continued to be the
primary avenue for doing business. 26 For example, Spanish Minister Irujo called on James Barry
to supply 20,000 barrels of flour to Puerto Rico on credit in exchange for permission to trade
with Cuba. 27 Irujo and Barry had established a business relationship under the permit system,
which they continued to leverage despite the change in the crown’s import policy. By November
of 1797, the royal monopolies could not meet the demand for supplies and the crown opened
Cuba and all other Spanish ports to trade with American merchants. 28
The period of Spanish prosperity from 1797 – 1799 consisted in part of profits from
contraband trade. 29 The importation of contraband tobacco was a profitable endeavor because of
the high taxes levied by the Crown’s Venezuelan tobacco monopoly. 30 Contraband trade was
significant enough to be included in an accounting of Spain’s payments for and income from
22

Id. at 77.
Linda K. Salvucci, Anglo-American Merchants and Stratagems for Success in Spanish Imperial Markets, 17831807, in THE NORTH AMERICAN ROLE IN THE SPANISH IMPERIAL ECONOMY, 1760-1819, 127, 129 (Jacques A.
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See FREDERICK AUGUSTUS FISCHER, TRAVELS IN SPAIN IN 1797 AND 1798 (A. Strahan, Printers-Street 1802) (full
text available on Google Books); Roy F. Nichols, supra note 7 at note 12.
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trade with her colonial territories. 31 From 1797 – 1807, the proportion of Spain’s income from
illegal to legal exports from the colonies was over 0.75 to 1. 32
c. The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade
North American merchants became permanently involved in significant business
relations in Spain and her colonies during wartime for both Spain and America. 33 In 1798,
America had entered the Quasi-War with France, and Spain was at war with England and France
during the latter part of the eighteenth century in an effort to regain status as a world power. 34
The years from 1793 to 1808 were a period of unprecedented prosperity for United States
farmers and merchants as military suppliers to Spain. 35 Beginning in 1779, British naval
blockades crippled Spanish delivery of supplies to the colonies, leading Spain to have to allow
American colonies to trade with Cuba. 36 This went against the pervading Spanish economic
policy of mercantilism which restricted trade with foreign nations in favor of monopolies on
supplies and food heavily taxed by the Crown. 37
Tobacco was the primary American agricultural export during the colonial period when
exports to England peaked at 100 million pounds in 1776. 38 There was a demand for tobacco in
America because early British settlers were accustomed and likely addicted to using tobacco in
England. Native Americans had their own tobacco habit, but smoked a different type of tobacco,

31

Javier Cuenca-Esteban, Statistics of Spain’s Colonial Trade 1747 – 1820: New Estimates and Comparisons with
Great Britain, 26 J. IBERIAN AND LATIN AM. ECON. HIST. 323, Table 3 (2008).
32
Id.
33
Harold A. Bierck, supra note 6 at 493.
34
Id. at 490.
35
Javier Cuenca Esteban, Trends and Cycles in U.S. Trade with Spain and the Spanish Empire, 1790 – 1819, 44 J.
ECON. HIST. 521, 521 (1984).
36
Roy F. Nichols, supra note 7 at 293.
37
See, e.g., id. at 290.
38
Stuart Allan, A Marketing History of the U.S. Tobacco Industry: From Colonial Times to the Great Depression,
Florida Atlantic University (1995),
http://faculty.quinnipiac.edu/charm/CHARM%20proceedings/CHARM%20article%20archive%20pdf%20format/V
olume%207%201995/237%20alan.pdf.
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which English settlers found too harsh compared to Spanish tobacco. 39 In the early seventeenth
century, Spain enjoyed a monopoly on tobacco, and strong anti-Spanish sentiment among British
settlers led them to risk their lives to smuggle seeds into the United States and grow their own
tobacco rather than patronize the Spanish crown. 40
Tobacco, known colloquially as sotweed, 41 was the colonies’ principal export during the
colonial period, and its production was concentrated in the Chesapeake tidewater region where
the crop grew abundantly. 42 In Maryland and Virginia around the Potomac River, planters grew
a common variety of tobacco called orinoco. 43 In the Chesapeake during the seventeenth
century, ninety percent of exports to Great Britain were tobacco, accounting for half of total
colonial exports to the home country. 44 After John Rolfe first planted tobacco in Jamestown
which he smuggled from Venezuela, production exploded from 2,300 pounds in 1615 to 500,000
pounds 1620 and over 15 million pounds in 1670.45 This enormous supply went directly to
England, because just as Spain had with her colonies, England imposed a policy of mercantilism
on exports from the American colonies prior to the Revolution. 46
However, British consumers were far from being the only end purchasers of Chesapeake
tobacco. 47 In the latter part of the eighteenth century, eighty-five percent of Chesapeake tobacco
shipped to England was re-exported to Holland, Germany and France. 48 Chesapeake tobacco
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Chesapeake Bay, The Colonial Period, 1607–1780, Mariner’s Museum, 2002
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Lorena S. Walsh, Plantation Management in the Chesapeake, 1620-1820, J. ECON. HIST., 396 (1989).
44
Jacob M. Price, The Economic Growth of the Chesapeake and the European Market, 1697-1775, J. ECON. HIST.,
496 (1964).
45
Miller supra note 41; Price supra note 44 at 497.
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Miller supra note 41.
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Price supra note 44 at 499.
48
Id.
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was cheaper than tobacco grown in the Spanish colonies, likely because of the significant taxes
levied by the Spanish crown’s tobacco monopoly. 49 Regarding France in particular, it seems
unlikely that the French would be involved in trading with Great Britain during a period in which
the two countries fought seven wars and imposed economic pressure on one another through
exclusionary trading practices. 50 Nevertheless, it is possible if not likely that in times of peace
and in times of war, leading right up to the time of Barry’s transaction with Manella, much of the
tobacco used in France originated in the Chesapeake.
This could have happened in two ways. During times of war, proceeds from French
privateers capturing ships laded with Chesapeake tobacco were enough to meet the full supply of
the French tobacco monopoly without having to trade with England. 51 This occurred in the early
part of the seventeenth century, and shows that Chesapeake tobacco was specifically sought by
French privateers like those who captured the Minerva in Manella v. Barry. 52 During peace
time, French trade with England was open, and France operated a monopoly on tobacco through
John Law’s Company of the Indies. 53 Until 1744 imported enough tobacco to become the largest
re-export market in the world for Chesapeake tobacco. 54 It is worth noting that James Barry had
business ties with Thomas Law’s East India Trading Company from his time living in India. 55
Though this was after John Law’s time, Barry’s mercantile involvement with the Law family
was likely a factor that led to the growth of his business, establishing him as a merchant in the
Chesapeake with enough capacity and influence to satisfy an order as large as Manella’s.
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See id at 500.
Id. at 501.
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Price supra note 44 at 524.
52
See chart on p.15 and text accompanying note 112.
53
Price supra note 44 at 524.
54
Id. at 505.
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Beyond being a source of revenue from exports to England, tobacco was of great
importance domestically. The cash crop served as a form of currency and taxation in the
Chesapeake when gold and silver were scarce. 56 Taxes on tobacco were also a principal source
of government revenue in Maryland, yielding $3,784 per year in 1700. 57 The principal
challenges with tobacco cultivation were the significant labor necessary for cultivation and the
exhaustion of a piece of land after three years of growing tobacco. 58 These factors led Maryland
tobacco farmers to invest heavily in slaves and exploit land owned by Native Americans. 59
These challenges also meant that plantation owners in Maryland and Virginia combined tobacco
cultivation with grain and wheat farming, which rose throughout the Chesapeake region
beginning in 1730. 60
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Miller supra note 41.
Id.
58
Price supra note 44 at 511.
59
Id. (“In some areas slave populations grew from 7% to 35% of the Chesapeake regions’ population between 1690
– 1750.”); see also Lorena S. Walsh, Plantation Management in the Chesapeake, 1620-1820, J. ECON. HIST., 393
(1989).
60
Walsh supra note 43 at 397.
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61

The first Maryland tobacco farms were organized around the Potomac river in Southern
Maryland. 62 After the Revolution, tobacco production in the state moved westward, but never
matched the scope of early production in Anne Arundel, Calvert, Charles, Prince George’s and
St. Mary’s counties. 63 During the colonial period, Catholic families established the state of
Maryland as a whole, and these counties in particular, as a haven where Catholics coming from
England could find religious toleration. 64 George Calvert, a Catholic and the first Lord
Baltimore, named the state and St. Mary’s County for the Catholic queen Henrietta Maria, wife
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Map of Southern Maryland counties initially involved in tobacco farming, National Register of Historic Places,
United States Department of the Interior National Park Service, 3 (2002),
http://www.preservationmaryland.org/uploads/file/Tobacco%20Barns/SoMD%20Tobacco%20Barns%20MPD_Fina
l.pdf.
62
National Register of Historic Places, United States Department of the Interior National Park Service, 1 (2002),
http://www.preservationmaryland.org/uploads/file/Tobacco%20Barns/SoMD%20Tobacco%20Barns%20MPD_Fina
l.pdf.
63
Id. at 2.
64
New Advent, Catholic Encyclopedia, Archdiocese of Baltimore, Colonial Period,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02228a.htm.
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of Charles I of England. 65 Accordingly, land ownership in these counties was dominated by
Catholic families. These included the influential family of Daniel Carroll, whose nephew
Charles Carroll of Carrollton signed the Declaration of Independence. 66 Daniel Carroll’s own
sons also enjoyed prominence, including John Carroll who was named the first Roman Catholic
bishop in the United States as Archbishop of Baltimore in 1790. 67 A close friend of James
Barry’s, Bishop John Carroll introduced Barry to the Spanish consuls with whom he initially did
business. 68 This introduction eventually led to Barry’s involvement in the transaction at issue in
Manella v. Barry. 69

70

Three factors during the eighteenth century impacted tobacco production in the
Chesapeake and the avenues through which the crop was sold: the Tobacco Inspection Acts of
65

Id.
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See infra notes 233–239 and accompanying text.
69
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70
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Department of the Interior National Park Service, 66 (2002),
http://www.preservationmaryland.org/uploads/file/Tobacco%20Barns/SoMD%20Tobacco%20Barns%20MPD_Fina
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1747, the American Revolution, and the growth of local urban markets. 71 When issues with
comparative tobacco quality arose and demand from England decreased, Virginia and Maryland
passed Inspection Acts which required all tobacco being exported to pass through a central
warehouse where the tobacco could be inspected. 72 This led to steadily increasing revenues for
tobacco farmers up until the American Revolution, and the concentration of tobacco farming in
large plantations which could absorb the increased costs associated with meeting quality
requirements. 73 The inspection warehouse system also allowed for faster international shipping
times and better packaging to preclude spoilage during overseas shipments. 74
During the Revolution, the Chesapeake experienced an economic depression as many
planters were called to military service and plantations experienced debilitating losses from
British raids. 75 Following the Revolution, the Chesapeake tobacco market carried more risk than
in the early seventeenth century when farmers could depend on high demand from British
importers. 76 Price fluctuation and falling land prices were common post-Revolution challenges
which contributed to the concentration of tobacco farming in larger producers, many from
western Maryland. 77 With the concentration of production in fewer growers also came greater
control of the tobacco market by domestic merchants. No longer did British mercantilism
control the destiny of Chesapeake tobacco, rather marketing was left to international sales
through businessmen with existing trading networks such as James Barry. 78 In addition, after the
Revolution, tobacco growing areas expanded beyond the Chesapeake tidewater region, moving

71

See Walsh supra note 43 at 401.
Mary McKinney Schweitzer, Economic Regulation and the Colonial Economy: The Maryland Tobacco Inspection
Act of 1747, J. ECON. HIST., 566 (1980).
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Id. at 565.
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to the west and south. 79 These regions produced different types of tobacco, allowing Maryland
and Virginia plantations to accommodate changing tastes in the European market for stronger
flavored tobacco. 80
The expansion of tobacco plantations beyond the tidewater region was one factor that led
to the rise of “fall line towns” along the Chesapeake such as Baltimore. 81 The topography of the
tidewater and piedmont waterways prohibited ships from passing further inland than the fall line
boundary. 82 The earliest Chesapeake planters established tobacco plantations inside of the fall
line where they had ocean access and could ship tobacco directly to England. 83 Once plantations
expanded beyond the fall lines, growers set up warehouses and shipping centers at the fall lines
of the westward flowing rivers so that they had access to waterways for transporting their
exports. 84 This development along the fall line eventually grew into towns including Baltimore,
Georgetown and Richmond. 85 Therefore, by 1798, large shipments of tobacco such as Barry’s
would have been sent from Baltimore or other fall line towns rather than directly from the
individual planters who sourced the tobacco.
In addition, increased populations in these towns established urban markets for
agricultural goods, and increased transportation of cargo by road and water further concentrated
agricultural exports in industrialized cities like Baltimore. One factor adding to the
industrialization of Baltimore was the growth of the export market for flour. In the late
eighteenth century, grain became a focus for Maryland planters responding to increased foreign
79

National Register of Historic Places, United States Department of the Interior National Park Service, 13 (2002),
http://www.preservationmaryland.org/uploads/file/Tobacco%20Barns/SoMD%20Tobacco%20Barns%20MPD_Fina
l.pdf.
80
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ERA 49 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
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Id. at 48.
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85
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demand for flour and easy cultivation in coastal soils. 86 Flour mills were then concentrated in
industrialized centers, coinciding with growth in population and commerce in Baltimore from
1790 – 1812. 87 Additionally, by 1810 road systems to Baltimore had improved, decreasing
shipping times. 88 This meant that local planters could more easily meet the demand for
perishable goods coming from new populations in urban centers. 89 Thus, with increased
industrialization from the milling industry and an increase in overall population, Baltimore
became a major shipping center for the Chesapeake region, eventually becoming the third largest
port city in the union. 90

91

II. NARRATIVE OF THE FACTS
A large international purchase of American tobacco began the conflict between plaintiff
Manella, Pujals & Co., and defendant James Barry. Manella, a Spanish merchant, sought to
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BIOG., 301 (1992).
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PEOPLE 6, 63 (Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1912).
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Maryland and Virginia were the primary American producers of tobacco in the nineteenth century. This image
portrays tobacco farming in Maryland (https://dutchpipesmoker.wordpress.com/2013/04/).
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purchase 1,528 hogsheads of American tobacco, a quantity worth over $2.7 million dollars
today. 92 At the time, the Spanish Crown operated a monopoly on the tobacco market, and only
sold Venezuelan tobacco. 93 In 1798 at the time of this transaction, Spain had reentered the
French Revolution as a French ally, following a one year period of neutrality prior to which
Spain was engaged in the war on the British side. 94 Because of the threat of British and French
privateering in West Indian waters, 95 Spain had to procure tobacco from a neutral party. The
entire transaction between Manella and Barry occurred because America was a neutral party at
the time of the transaction, and the tobacco could be shipped without threat of seizure by an
enemy vessel. However, America’s neutral status at sea was short lived because by the summer
of 1798, the same year the transaction with Manella was initiated, America was engaged in the
Quasi-War with France and subject to attacks by French privateers on its merchant ships.

96

92

97

Calculation of $204,077.77 in today’s dollars using the Inflation Calculator,
http://www.westegg.com/inflation/infl.cgi.
93
Harold A. Bierck, supra note 9 at 490.
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Roy F. Nichols, supra note 7 at 295.
95
Id. at 293.
96
Tobacco was shipped in a wooden barrel called a hogshead, shown in this image. A hogshead could hold up to
1,000 pounds of tobacco ( http://amhistory.si.edu/onthewater/exhibition/1_3.html).

17

To facilitate the tobacco purchase, Manella’s associate, Bernardo Lacosta, 98 wrote a letter
in Spanish to his American contact James Barry asking him to secure and ship the tobacco under
Barry’s name. Barry was to be paid a five percent commission. This type of business contact
between Spanish and North American merchant friends who had previously done business
together was typical of trade networks of the time period given the trade restrictions that
existed. 99 James Barry had experience doing business with Spanish merchants, beginning with
his introduction to Spanish diplomats Joséf de Jaudénes, Marqués de Casa Irujo, and José
Ignazio Viar by Bishop John Carroll in the 1790’s. 100 This trading relationship began because
Barry was able to supply flour on credit to Spain when it could not satisfy the demand from
Puerto Rico, a Spanish colony at the time. 101

102

In his letter to Barry of January 27, 1798, Bernardo Lacosta clarified Juan Alonzo
Menedez Conde’s (Menendez) role in the transaction, writing that “Mr. Conde goes to Baltimore
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The tobacco was pressed into the hogshead by plantation workers, sometimes slaves, who would pile the dried
leaves into the barrel and use a lever to compress the tobacco
(http://amhistory.si.edu/onthewater/exhibition/1_3.html).
98
The case papers refer to this man as Bernardo Lacosta, but other sources refer to him as Bernardo La Costa.
99
Perrone, Sean, supra note 16 at 79.
100
Linda K. Salvucci, supra note 23 at 129.
101
See infra Part VII.A.
102
Portrait of Marqués de Casa Irujo by Gilbert Stuart, from Linda K. Salvucci, Merchants and Diplomats:
Philadelphia’s Early Trade with Cuba, 3 PENNSYLVANIA LEGACIES 6, 8 (2003).
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as agent 103 of the house of Messrs. Manella, Pujals & Co. of this place, principally interested in
the importation of tobacco for this kingdom.” 104 The letter enumerated in eleven points exactly
how the tobacco was to be shipped: in six to eight vessels, with American captains and with a
bill of lading and other papers in James Barry’s name. 105 Included in the ships’ papers was to be
a letter from Barry stating that the tobacco was consigned to Lacosta, Manella, and one other
firm in Cadíz. Lacosta also stipulated that if the crown would not let the tobacco be unloaded at
Cádiz, the ships were to proceed to Genoa. 106 This suggests that Barry’s tobacco was to be sold
as contraband since there were instructions from Manella about what to do should the tobacco be
restricted from entering Spain at Cádiz. The fifth point indicated that there should be two sets of
papers aboard each ship, one showing that the vessel was destined for Cadíz, and one for
Geonoa. 107 Additionally, Lacosta wrote that the tobacco should not be shipped at more than ten
dollars per quintal, but that if none was available at that price, Barry could consult with
Menendez about whether they need to go over this price by $0.25 or $0.50 so as to prevent
delay. 108 Furthermore, Lacosta directed Barry to draw on creditors from Hamburg, London,
Amsterdam, and Lisbon. 109 Lacosta also wrote in this letter, “I refer you to the verbal
communication of the bearer of this subject who is sent on purpose to superintend the
shipment.” 110 Menendez delivered the letter to Barry on March 22, 1798, and shortly thereafter
Barry began to ship the tobacco.
In accordance with Lacosta’s instructions, Barry shipped the tobacco to Cadíz as follows:

103

The word ‘agent’ was underlined in the circuit court record.
Manella, Pujals, and Co. v. James Barry, 7 U.S. 415, 416 (1806).
105
Id. at 416–18.
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Id.at 417.
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Id. at 418.
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Id.
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Shipping
Date

Vessel
Name

Vessel
Nationality

Hogsheads Value of
of Tobacco Tobacco ($)

Shipped To

Shipped on
Account of

April 28,
1798

Muqueni

Moorish

62

8,846.36

Messrs. Gahn
& Co.

James
Barry

May 18,
1798

Minerva

Danish

270

27,868.35

Messrs. Pablo, James
Greppi,
Barry
Marliani & Co.

May 26,
1798

Polly and
Nancy

American

500

60,914.56

Bernardo
Lacosta

James
Barry

July 10,
1798

Felicity

American

100

13,876.48

Messrs. Gahn
& Co.

Don Carlos
Longhy

July 23,
1798

Susanna

American

117

17,269.77

Messrs. Pablo, Don Carlos
Greppi,
Longhy
Marliani & Co.

August 16, Henrietta
1798

American

288

43,064.54

Bernardo
Lacosta

Don Carlos
Longhy

November
8, 1798

American

191

Bernardo
Lacosta

James
Barry

Fly

Of the seven ships sent for Cadíz, the British captured the Muqueni and Henrietta and the French
captured the Minerva. 111 Four out of seven ships arrived safely at their destination. 112 At trial,
both sides agreed that Menendez was present when Barry chartered the Moorish and Danish
ships, and that Menendez approved those vessels because they were of neutral nationality and
American vessels were not available. 113 In giving his verbal approval, Menendez showed Robert
Barry, nephew and business associate of James Barry, a letter written in Spanish authorizing the
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verbal instructions. 114 In two letters dated May 28th and 29th, 1798, Menendez wrote to Barry
confirming the shipments. 115
Menendez wrote again to Barry on June 14, 1798, expressing concern over America’s
entry into war with France and the attendant loss of neutrality status. 116 Menendez had left
America to return to Spain on June 4, 1798 from Alexandria. 117 In this letter, Menendez directed
the remainder of the shipments to be made on Danish or Swedish vessels to Messrs. Pablo,
Greppi, Marliani & Co., with papers in the name of Charles Longhy of Genoa stating explicitly
that Barry is acting as Longhy’s agent. 118 Menendez included in letters to Messrs. Pablo,
Greppi, Marliani & Co. that a letter should accompany the shipments of cargo for the sole
purpose of explicating the agency relationship between Barry and Longhy. 119 Additionally,
Menendez provided instructions for making the shipments on American vessels in case Barry
had already chartered them. 120 In this scenario as well, Menendez took pains to ensure that the
cargo was safe from capture by the French, even if the vessel itself was taken by a French
privateer. Barry received this letter before the shipment on the Henrietta was made. 121
Menendez’s concerns came to fruition when the British captured the Henrietta.
On the same day, Menendez also wrote to Robert Barry, stating that there were to be two
separate invoices accompanying the cargo. 122 One invoice was to be sent and charged to
Bernardo Lacosta with a $2.50 per quintal overcharge, and one with the real costs was to be sent
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to Mr. Joseph Anthony de Sola, administrator of the king’s tobacco stores in Cadíz. 123 De Sola
was also to receive a copy of the invoice with the overcharges sent to Lacosta. 124
To recover for the cargo lost at sea to the French and British, Manella sued in the Circuit
Court of Maryland for an initial sum of $100,000, the amount Manella had advanced to Barry to
ship the tobacco. 125 Manella’s claim was of trespass on the case, a catchall tort used at the time
to recover damages resulting indirectly from the defendant’s actions. 126 The amount claimed
was later amended to $200,000 after Barry failed to appear in court. 127 It is likely that Barry did
not appear in court because he was outside the court’s jurisdiction. In 1800 at the time of his
trial, Barry had moved to Washington, D.C. and later moved to New York. 128 In Barry’s
absence, court marshal David Hopkins called Barry’s nephew Robert Barry and Hugh Thompson
to appear in court on James Barry’s behalf on May 7, 1801. 129 Attorneys Robert Goodloe Harper
and John Purviance represented Manella, and Walter Dorsey, Luther Martin, and William
Pinkney represented Barry. 130 A Petit Jury of twenty before Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth
found for Barry, awarding $18 in court costs on May 1, 1805. 131
Manella appealed, filing a writ of error with the Supreme Court with two bills of
exceptions. 132 The first contested the translation of the phrase “para presenter la expedición” in
Lacosta’s letter of January 27, 1798. 133 Manella argued that this phrase meant “to be present at,
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or assist in, the shipments” as opposed to the translation used in the Circuit Court case papers,
“to superintend the shipments.” 134 In the second bill of exceptions, Manella argued that the firm
was entitled to recover from Barry the value of the cargo on the three ships that were captured,
plus the price of tobacco on those vessels above what was stipulated in Lacosta’s written
instructions, because Barry had incorrectly relied on Menendez’s verbal instructions.
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
a. Legal Background
Maritime prize doctrine governed the high seas during the Quasi-War between the United
States and France. 135 In wartime, privateers from belligerent nations could capture merchant
ships of the enemy at sea and lawfully take the vessel, cargo, or both. 136 Privateering was
valuable both to the privateer crews themselves and to their sovereign states. The privateers
stood to earn the full financial value of the capture, and the sovereign states benefitted from the
crippling effect privateers had on the war effort of enemy nations. 137 American privateers had a
significant impact on enemy nations, capturing 2,500 British merchant ships during the War of
1812. 138 These merchant ships were often carrying cargo to supply troops with provisions and
munitions, so their capture meant a setback on the ground as well.
With prize law governing the high seas during the time of the tobacco shipment in
Manella v. Barry, the capture of Barry’s three ships was both unsurprising and most likely legal.
Lacosta’s instructions to ship the cargo under a neutral name indicated that Lacosta knew of the
risk of seizure at sea. Consistent with Lacosta’s premonition, French privateers captured the
134
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Muqueni and Minerva, neutral Moorish and Danish vessels, chartered under James Barry’s
American name. As long as the French captured these vessels after the United States’ entry into
the Quasi-War with France in summer of 1798, this was lawful prize taking. Even though the
vessels were neutral, the cargo was laded in James Barry’s name, so it would have been enemy
cargo subject to seizure.
Later, the British captured the Henrietta, an American vessel with cargo shipped to
Bernardo Lacosta in Spain on account of Don Carlos Longhy of Genoa, Italy. There are several
reasons why the British might have captured this vessel, even though during the Quasi-War with
France, the U.S. and Great Britain were allied against France. The law of nations stipulated that
a country at war had the right to confiscate property of the enemy wherever found, but not the
property of an ally. 139 With regard to neutral vessels, the law stated that “[a] belligerent [could]
arrest a neutral vessel on the high seas for any breach of neutrality.” 140 Thus, the Henrietta was
probably not captured because it was American but because its cargo was headed for Spain,
which was allied with France against Great Britain in the war. The captors would have initially
reviewed the sets of papers on board the Henrietta, and discovered that the tobacco was destined
for Spain to be sold to Spanish merchant, Bernardo Lacosta. Shipping and admiralty law
allowed the likely use of an article to be inferred from its destination. 141 Additionally,
“[p]roperty belonging to a merchant residing at an enemy’s port is liable to condemnation.” 142
Finally, the origin of the property could give it hostile character. 143 For all of these reasons, the
Henrietta was vulnerable to British privateers because it was American tobacco destined for a
Spanish port to be sold to a Spanish merchant.
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The tobacco on board all seven ships sent by Barry was also subject to seizure at sea
under the law of nations because of the fraudulent papers on board each ship. Shipping and
admiralty law included a penalty for carrying contraband goods. 144 All of the tobacco in
Manella v. Pujals was contraband because at the time as there was a royal monopoly on tobacco
in Spain which sourced its tobacco exclusively from Venezuela. 145 The ships were also subject
to seizure because where the owner knows about a fraudulent transaction and a ship carrying
goods under false papers, the vessel itself and its cargo will be considered lawful prize. 146
Lacosta and Menendez’s letters about shipping the cargo under neutral cover indicates that they
were aware that Barry’s ships were subject to seizure.
In addition to prize law, the law of agency was the basis for the holding in Manella, and
is rooted in the English common law of contracts. 147 As early as 1389, British courts recognized
agency relationships in the mercantile context, holding that a principal was liable for the failure
of his apprentice to remit payment. 148 By the 17th and 18th centuries, the word “agent” came
into use, and the law of agency became an official part of English common law under Chief
Justice Holt of the English Court of Chancery. 149 Chief Justice Holt looked to rules followed in
admiralty law with regard to ship owners, masters and merchants to establish the common law
rules of agency. 150 In issuing his holding in Manella a century later, Chief Justice Marshall
asserted that it was an established point of law that an agent must act in furtherance of the
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principal’s interests. 151 This is still true today, as agency relationships are a ubiquitous part of
doing business in the modern world. 152 Rather, the issue in Manella was whether the third
party’s deviation from the instructions of an agent were justified. 153
In the arguments for the appellant, there was a discussion of the difference between
specific and general agency, and whether that distinction established that Barry should not have
relied on Menendez’s instructions. 154 The law on specific and general agency stipulates that the
entire series of transactions described in Lacosta’s January letter to Barry would have been an
instance of specific agency because it did not involve a continuity of service. 155 Chief Justice
Marshall did not entertain this distinction, but if he did, the entire shipment of tobacco in the
seven vessels would likely have been considered one series of transactions, which a specific
agent is legally authorized to oversee.

b. The Arguments
Manella’s appeal reached the Supreme Court on February 4, 1806 after five years in the
Circuit Court system. 156 Representing Manella, Robert Goodloe Harper raised two issues: 1)
whether Barry had deviated from Lacosta’s written instructions and 2) whether Barry was
justified to deviate from the letter by Menendez’s direction. 157 On the first question, Harper
focused on the shipment of goods in non-American ships, and the shipment on the Henrietta
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which was not in James Barry’s own name, but in the name of Carlos Longhy of Genoa. 158 On
the second question, Harper focused on Lacosta’s letter of January 27, 1798 which gave explicit
direction about the shipment, including the price of the tobacco. 159
Harper argued that Barry was not justified in substituting his judgment for Manella’s
because Lacosta’s instructions were explicit. Further, there was no justification to rely on
Menendez’s direction because there was no evidence to support his role as Manella’s agent. 160 If
there was any agency relationship between Menendez and Manella, it was one of specific and not
general agency. 161 Harper further argued that the correct translation of the phrase “para
presentaiar la expedición” allowed Menendez to communicate with Barry about the shipment
only in accordance with the written instructions, not to control the enterprise as a whole. 162
Harper even alluded in the Supreme Court minutes that Menendez’s testimony was the evidence
necessary, and perhaps he was being kept away in Spain. 163
Representing Barry, attorneys William Pinkney and Luther Martin, began by engendering
doubt in the Court as to Manella’s integrity based on the fraudulent double sets of papers aboard
each ship and the explicit attempt to evade the Spanish government by shipping in neutral
vessels. 164 Unlike Manella’s attorneys, Pinkney and Martin focused their argument around
Manella’s three claims: 1) the excess in price above the instructions 2) the cargo shipped in
Moorish and Danish vessels and 3) the Henrietta’s cargo. 165 As to the shipment in Moorish and
Danish vessels, Pinkney and Martin argued that the goods were to be shipped in neutral ships,
and with America entering into the Quasi-War with France in the midst of the shipments, the
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cargo is no more safe in American ships than in neutral ships generally. 166 Additionally, there
was no way for Lacosta to know whether Barry would be able to find six or more American
ships for this purpose, so it wouldn’t make sense for the foreign merchant to require this in its
instructions. 167 The arguments for the defendant closed by highlighting that the shipments on the
Moorish and Danish vessels were made in the same manner as those on the Felicity and Susanna,
both of which arrived safely at their destination. 168
The argument around the shipment on the Henrietta also centered on America’s loss of
neutrality status at the time. Pinkney and Martin stressed that the whole point of Barry shipping
the goods in his name was because Barry was a neutral party at the time Lacosta wrote his letter.
Six months later, Barry’s American name was no longer neutral, constituting a material change
in circumstances. 169 In carrying out Lacosta’s instructions as to the shipment, Barry was bound
to trust Menendez regarding any ambiguity. Menendez’s verbal instructions were reasonably in
furtherance of the enterprise as a whole, and there was no evidence that he had acted
fraudulently. 170 As to the question about why Menendez’s testimony has not been brought to
court, Martin and Pinkney answered that they sent a commission to Spain to examine Menendez,
but were unsuccessful. 171 The time taken to seek out Menendez could have been a factor in
Manella’s case languishing in court as long as it did. Martin and Pinkney asked in response why
the attorneys for Manella did not seek out Menendez to sue him rather than Barry. 172 This was
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likely because Menendez did not have a substantial fortune worth seeking in suit, or because it
would have been too hard to bring him in for litigation. 173
In response, attorney Philip Barton Key focused on Barry and Menendez’s limited
authority regarding the details of the shipment. He did not address America’s loss of neutrality
status during the time of the seven shipments, and stressed that the letter required the cargo to be
shipped in American vessels only. Key argued that Menendez had no authority to deviate from
Lacosta’s instructions. 174
c. The Decision
On February 26, 1806, Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.
Marshall distilled the issue in the case down to whether Barry deviated from Lacosta’s
instructions. 175 Marshall highlighted that Lacosta’s letter directed Barry to refer to Menendez’s
verbal instructions because Menendez was sent to superintend the shipment. The Chief Justice
referenced the evidence that, upon dispatching the Moorish and Danish vessels, Menendez
approved these shipments since American vessels were not available and America had lost
neutrality status. 176 The Court finds that this was a fair interpretation of Lacosta’s letter given
the circumstances, and that Barry was bound to comply with Menendez’s direction. Further,
Marshall wrote that the letter was a communication to Barry of instructions from Lacosta to
Menendez, not instructions from Lacosta directly to Barry. 177 That Barry could have declined to
fulfill the fraudulent transaction entirely, as many American merchants had done, further
supported Menendez’s power to superintend the shipments. 178 “[I]t seems to the court perfectly
173
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clear, that with respect to the tobacco shipped in the Moorish and Danish vessels, the conduct of
the defendant, being sanctioned by Menendez, was free from all exception.” 179
The Court viewed Manella’s claim for the value of cargo shipped on the Henrietta as a
stronger claim. 180 The evidence showed that Barry deviated from the explicit written directions
to ship the goods in his own name, but in defense Barry argued that he justifiably relied on
Menendez’s verbal instructions. 181 The Court agreed. 182 Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that
Lacosta’s letter referenced Menendez’s verbal instructions and his role as agent of the
principal, 183 giving Menendez the right to exercise discretion as to the shipment. 184 Furthermore,
all of Menendez’s decisions that deviated from the written instructions in Lacosta’s letter were
reasonable given America’s loss of neutrality status during the course of the shipments. 185
Therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed.
d. Analysis
The issue in Manella as defined by Chief Justice John Marshall was whether James Barry
deviated from Menendez’s instructions. 186 Barry’s alleged deviation with respect to the three
captured ships was that the cargo was shipped on Moorish and Danish vessels instead of
American vessels, and on account of Bernardo Lacosta instead of in his own name. Given
America’s loss of neutrality status during the process of shipping the tobacco and the nature of
international trade in the eighteenth century, Chief Justice John Marshall correctly affirmed the
lower court’s decision. James Barry rightfully relied on Menendez’s instructions, even though
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the instructions deviated from Lacosta’s written instructions in the letter of January 27, 1798.
Thus, Barry was not liable to Manella for the price of the lost cargo.
Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning rested largely on the change in circumstances between
the date of Lacosta’s letter and each vessel’s shipping date. The United States’ entry into QuasiWar with France meant that Barry would have put Manella at risk if Barry insisted on following
precisely the instructions in Lacosta’s initial letter. What’s more, this would have been
unreasonable because Menendez was sent as Manella’s agent to “superintend the shipment.”
Regardless of how those words are construed, common sense dictates that Menendez and Barry
had to decide how best to ship the cargo so as to ensure safe passage. After all, Manella and
Lacosta were an ocean away from Baltimore when the ships were being dispatched. Because of
the challenges inherent to international trade at this time, agents were sent to make decisions
exactly like those Menendez made. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, all of Menendez’s
decisions and all of Barry’s actions were reasonable given the change in circumstances, and were
in furtherance of Manella’s best interests in the enterprise as a whole.
The rule in Manella is that a factor transacting with a principal through an agent is
justified in relying on the agent’s instructions if those instructions are reasonably in furtherance
of the principal’s interest, even if they conflict with the principal’s written instructions. This rule
still holds today, but one can imagine the string of emails and cell phone calls which would be
made between the principal and agent to confirm a change such as the one made by Menendez.
In 1798, these modes of instant communication were unavailable, necessitating the use of agents
to effectuate international trade deals. By virtue of his charge as agent to act in the best interests
of his principals, Menendez’s changes to the original instructions were reasonable, and Barry
was justified in relying on them.
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IV. EFFECT OF THE DECISION
Manella v. Barry is still good law and is relevant enough to have been cited by secondary
sources as recently as 2014. A Legal Encyclopedia update from 2014 cites to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Manella in Section III, Rights and Duties as Between a Factor and Principal.
If the factor is referred to a general agent of the principal, the duty of a factor or agent is to obey
instructions by a principal, and the factor may justifiably obey orders of the agent, even if they
conflict with written instructions from the principal. 187
Manella has also been cited as a part of the evolution of the contra proferentem doctrine
of contract interpretation. Appleman’s treatise on Insurance Law includes the case in its
description of this doctrine. 188 Contra proferentem originated in English common law and was
described by Sir Francis Bacon as a rule stating “that a man’s deeds and his words shall be taken
strongliest [sic] against himself” and which is “one of the most common grounds of the law.” 189
The Virginia Supreme Court cited this maxim in 1794. 190 Historically, contra proferentem was a
last resort doctrine whereby ambiguous contracts were construed “against the drafter” only
where a tie-breaker was necessary. 191
Manella is an example of an early American case where the contra proferentem doctrine
was applied to a business transaction done across a great distance. The distance made
negotiations impossible, so the burden of clarity was on the contract drafter. 192 In Manella, the
ambiguity arose in Menendez’s letters subsequent to Lacosta’s letter of January 27, 1798, the
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only one in which Lacosta specified his instructions. Menendez’s subsequent verbal instructions
to James and Robert Barry compounded the ambiguity of the letters. The Supreme Court found
that Lacosta’s instructions to Barry did not require him to send the tobacco in American vessels,
only that the vessels be neutral. This broad construction of Lacosta’s letter is an example of
construing ambiguity against the drafter of a business agreement based on the contra proferentem
doctrine.
Additionally, Manella is cited as an example of Supreme Court references to Muslims,
for the description of the Moorish ship Muqueni which the British captured while en route to
Cadíz. 193
The case law that followed Manella cites the case primarily with regard to agency law. 194
There are cases referencing Manella from 1805 to 1891 ranging from a common pleas court up
to the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, all of which reinforced its holding. 195 Manella’s
holding is cited in an 1891 case from the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania for the rule of
agency law that an agent who departs from the instructions of his principal assumes the risk of
loss. 196 The Supreme Court of Ohio cited Manella in holding that an accredited agent must act
with fidelity to his copartners. 197 The Supreme Court of Missouri cited Manella in 1870 as the
strongest authority establishing the proposition that an agent must act in conformity with his
instructions. 198 The Supreme Court of Florida cited Manella in an 1850 decision related to
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agency law, supporting the proposition that an agent has a duty to pursue the orders of his
principal to the best of his ability. 199
Manella has also been referenced as authority for the evidence through which an agency
relationship may be established. In Page v. Lathrop, the Missouri Supreme Court cited Manella
to support the proposition that an agency relationship need not be established directly on a bill
sent to a creditor. 200 The evidence in Manella of Menendez’s status as agent came from
Lacosta’s January 1798 letter, and was not noted directly on the bills to each creditor. That this
relationship could arise from such a letter as opposed to a bill was not contested, rather the issue
in Manella was whether the letter established the agency relationship or not. Thus, the letter
separate from the bill draft in Page was held to be admissible evidence, and sufficient to
establish agency. 201
In addition to the references to agency law, Manella has been cited as one of many early
American maritime cases supporting the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over
admiralty law where the English admiralty court would not exercise jurisdiction. 202
The United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited Manella in 1857 to establish
the limited authority of an agent to act on behalf of the principal. 203 The facts in The Joseph
Grant, are similar to those in Manella and are worth discussion here. In The Joseph Grant,
Fitzhugh & Littlejohn, a grain company, was purchasing corn in Chicago and shipping it to
Oswego, New York on the schooner Joseph Grant. 204 George M. Chapman was the master
onboard the ship, and had duplicate bills of lading consigning the cargo to Fitzhugh &
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Littlejohn. 205 In the course of the shipment, Chapman wrote a blank bill of lading drawing on
the Marine Bank of Chicago to cover advances on drafts. 206 Soon after the receipt of the corn,
Fitzhugh & Littlejohn’s business failed, and the Marine Bank of Chicago brought suit against the
vessel for failing to deliver the cargo described in the blank bill of lading which Chapman filled
out. 207 The Circuit Court held that Chapman exceeded his authority as Fitzhugh & Littlejohn’s
agent in writing the bill of lading to the Marine Bank of Chicago, and the suit would not be
enforced against the vessel for failing to deliver the cargo. 208
This is consistent with the holding in Manella because the facts are distinguishable. In
both cases, an agent went beyond his principal’s stipulations. However in Manella, Menendez’s
actions were consistent with Lacosta’s written instructions directing Barry to rely on Menendez’s
verbal instructions. Additionally, Lacosta wrote in his initial letter to Barry that he may ship
tobacco above the price of $10 per quintal 209 so as to expedite the shipment. There is an element
of trust built into Lacosta’s instructions, both in Barry and in Menendez acting as agent, and the
Court found Barry’s actions to be reasonable given the circumstances. In contrast, Chapman’s
actions in The Joseph Grant could not bind his principal because they went beyond the scope of
the agency relationship. Chapman wrote a blank bill of lading to a creditor that did not have
cargo to support it, an action that the principal knew nothing about. The bill of lading was not
enforceable against the vessel because the agency relationship was a limited one. Thus, a
principal will not be bound to an agent’s actions of which he has no knowledge or consent.

205

Id.
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 1142.
209
The quintal was the favored unit of mass to measure dry agricultural products in Latin America in the eighteenth
century. In Spain the measure was defined as 100 pounds, though other countries defined a quintal as 100
kilograms. See, e.g., FREDERICK ARTHUR HALSEY & SAMUEL SHERMAN DALE, THE METRIC FALLACY, 6, (The
American Institute of Weights and Measures, 1919).
206

35

The United States Circuit Court of Virginia cited Manella in 1805, again related to
agency law. In Dunbar v. Miller, Manella was cited in a summary of decisions by United States
federal courts relating to a principal and agent, and consignor and consignee. 210
V. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PEOPLE IN THE STORY
At the time of his favorable verdict in Manella v. Barry, James Barry no longer lived in
Baltimore and was near the end of his life. In 1805, Barry and his family had moved from
Washington to New York, where Barry lived until his death in 1808. 211 Barry died of influenza
in January of 1808, and Archbishop John Carroll expressed concern for Barry’s declining health
in a letter to Joanna Barry in June of 1806. 212 Thus, it is unlikely that Barry was involved in the
Spanish-American trade networks that led to the conflict in Manella v. Barry following
adjudication of the case.
As for the Spanish actors in the case, there is little to no reference to them beyond the
court records of Manella v. Barry. A review of Spanish consuls and their trade networks lists
Bernardo Lacosta as one of thirty-six Spanish merchants who received letters from John
Stoughton, Spanish Consul to New England between 1795 and 1820. 213 In this record, Lacosta’s
name is spelled “Bernardo La Costa.” There is inconsistency in the names of other Spanish
actors in the case, likely because of variable translations. 214 This makes recordkeeping a
challenge, but it is not unlikely that Manella, Pujals & Co., the Spanish trading firm illegally
importing tobacco could not sustain the $100,000 loss of cargo onboard the Muqueni, Minerva,
and Henrietta, plus the costs of adjudication, and dissolved after paying its creditors.
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The merchant ships are also sparsely mentioned in historical records from the time of the
case. The Polly and Nancy, one of the ships that successfully made it to Cadíz, originated in
South Carolina and was built in 1761. It was owned by Daniel Hutchings and Edward Blake. 215
The dearth of information on the seven merchant ships involved in this case could be because
they were subsequently captured on other international trade missions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conflict between Manella, Pujals & Co. and James Barry in this case demonstrates
the risks inherent to overseas trade during wartime. The lucrative nature of the contraband
tobacco trade in Spain was enough to compel Manella to brave exposure to French and British
privateers in the waters of the Mediterranean. That over half of the ships dispatched by Barry
arrived successfully is surprising given the high likelihood of capture by privateers during the
Quasi-War with France. In the subsequent Napoleonic Wars between Britain and France and the
War of 1812, blockades of the East Coast crippled American trade, and likely kept these same
ships from reentering American ports if they had not already been captured.
More than anything, Manella v. Barry depicts the intricate Spanish-American maritime
trade networks that existed during wartime. The friendships that established the foundation of
the trade relationships in this story show that international business trusts began with personal
relationships such as that between Archbishop John Carroll and James Barry. That Spanish
consuls were sent to reside in America indicates the crown’s acknowledgement of the need to
establish these relationships. Spanish consuls were further instantiated into American culture as
some married into American families.
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The law coming out of this case on the rules of agency in maritime trading was not new.
Chief Justice John Marshall himself acknowledged that it was well-established that a third party
must obey the instructions of an agent. What Manella added to the law on agency is the scope of
an agent’s authority in effectuating an overseas trade. The Court put great stake on the fact that
Menendez’s instructions to Barry were reasonable given America’s loss of neutrality status, and
in furtherance of the overall enterprise of the principal. This was consistent with the established
roles of agent and principal at the time and today. Since the law surrounding this conflict seems
straightforward, it is likely that Manella sought recovery from Barry because the firm could not
pay its creditors without income from the tobacco, and sued in a last ditch effort to get money
from the wealthy American merchant.
VII. APPENDIX
The following biography details the life of James Barry, the central actor in Manella v.
Barry. This section serves to further develop the background of this historical figure, placing the
case in context of the lives involved.

a. Profile of James Barry
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James Barry (1755? – 1808) was born in Ireland and lived in India and Portugal before
arriving with his wife Joanna in Baltimore. 217 There is some inconsistency as to when Barry
first arrived in Baltimore. A biographical sketch of Barry written in 1940 references 1793 as the
date he arrived in Baltimore, but a 1979 article in the Maryland Historical Magazine notes that
Barry was appointed Vice-Counsel of Portugal for Maryland and Virginia in 1791. 218 All
sources agree that Barry served as the Portuguese Counsel. 219
The first references to Barry as a Baltimore merchant are in The Maryland Journal and
Baltimore Advertiser in 1794 and Barry is listed as a merchant in the Baltimore Town and Fell’s
Point Directory in 1796 as a merchant of 100 Baltimore street. 220 Barry is also listed as a charter
member of the Library Company of Baltimore on December 20, 1795, which merged with the
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Maryland Historical Society in 1854. 221 His name disappears from Baltimore’s business and
residence directories in 1802 because Barry had moved to Washington D.C. and later to New
York. 222 This absence is consistent with the difficulty the Circuit Court of Maryland had in
getting Barry to appear in court in May of 1801 during his trial. 223 In addition to Barry’s move
to new cities, there are references to Barry losing his fortune. 224 He was likely experiencing
financial troubles around the time of his trial and may have ceased to conduct his business
activities in Baltimore, accounting for his absence from business records. 225
By all accounts, James Barry was an upstanding gentleman and merchant. Even Robert
Goodloe Harper stated at Barry’s Supreme Court trial that representing Manella against Barry
was the hardest case of his entire career because he had to “urge a claim against an honourable
and respectable man.” 226 Thomas Law, a friend of Barry’s, wrote that he found Mr. Barry a
“very gentlemanly man, [who] was extremely civil, offering me, in the most friendly manner, his
services during my stay in Baltimore.” 227 Indeed a gentleman, Barry was invited to dine with
George Washington at Mt. Vernon on October 24, 1797. 228
An interesting diversion from the consistently favorable references to Barry’s character
was an incident involving a fatal duel. Barry was involved as “second” for Mr. Thomas
Hadfield in a duel with David Sterett on Friday April 29, 1791 in Howard Park, in which Mr.
Sterett was killed. 229 Barry and William Buchanan were charged with aiding and abetting
Sterett’s murder, but were granted a nolle prosequi by John Eager Howard, Esq. who presided
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over the case as Governor of Maryland. 230 Luther Martin was Maryland’s Attorney General at
the time, and brought the case against Barry and Buchanan. 231 Martin would later find himself
arguing in Barry’s defense at the Circuit Court trial of Manella v. Barry. Thirty four men
petitioned the Court in Barry’s favor, and Jas Calhoun wrote a letter attesting to Barry’s good
character. 232
James Barry was a Roman Catholic, and it was a religious tie that initially involved him
in Spanish-American trading networks. 233 Bishop John Carroll introduced Barry to Josef de
Jáudenes, “the only man with authority to sell trading permits to Cuba in the 1790s” and José
Ignacio Viar. 234 This initial connection led Barry to procure crown contracts to supply Spanish
troops with flour. 235 Archbishop Carroll corresponded frequently with Mr. and Mrs. Barry, and
his letter of June 19, 1806 is cited by the Maryland Historical Society in a Selected Bibliography
on Maryland History in Other Journals. 236 Carroll’s letters to the Barry family convey with
affection and warmth that he saw them as his closest friends. 237 By this time, Joanna and James
lived in New York, and Archbishop Carroll expressed interest in visiting and concern for James
Barry’s health. 238 When Barry’s will was executed in New York in 1807, Bishop John Carroll
was executor along with Colonel John Eagar Howard, Governor and Senator of Maryland. 239
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Beyond the initial introduction between Barry and the Spanish diplomats, Bishop John
Carroll’s relationship with Barry likely influenced the procurement of the 1,528 hogsheads of
tobacco in the transaction at issue in Manella v. Barry. John Carroll’s father, Daniel Carroll, was
a prominent planter and landowner in colonial Maryland whose property included land in
Southern Maryland used to cultivate tobacco. As the first Roman Catholic bishop, John Carroll
occupied a position of great influence among other Catholics in Maryland during the colonial
period, who would have been landowners cultivating tobacco themselves. Whether it was
Carroll tobacco that Barry sent to Manella or tobacco from John Carroll’s associates, the
Catholic Church in Maryland likely profited from Barry’s transaction with Manella.
John Carroll’s archdiocese could have profited from Barry’s transaction in two ways.
First, if the tobacco sent to Manella was Carroll tobacco, the family owned plantations would
have directly benefitted from the large transaction. A second and more definitive possibility is
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based on the tobacco tax. Proceeds from this tax went directly to the church. 241 It was common
in the eighteenth century for taxes to be levied on tobacco to build church buildings, and
agricultural exports in general were taxed at this time. 242 These are both examples of the church
benefitting from state legislation in Maryland, a practice known as clericalism which was
common at the time. 243 When John Carroll became Archbishop in 1790, he was likely already in
the early stages of planning the construction of the Baltimore Basilica, which began in 1806. 244
Thus, Archbishop John Carroll would have been interested in potential proceeds from Barry’s
transaction with Manella, be they direct or indirect, to finance the construction of his Basilica.
Following the initial connection that Archbishop John Carroll made, Barry continued to
cultivate trading relationships in Spain. James Barry was one of the first merchants given
permission to do business in Cuba after the Spanish reentry into the war in 1796. Upon declaring
war, Cuba and Puerto Rico both needed food, and Spain couldn’t supply it, so the Spanish
Minister, Marquís de Casa Irujo, opened trade on a monopoly basis with certain merchants.
James Barry was given a permit to sell 20,000 pounds of flour in Cuba in exchange for having
provided food to Puerto Rico on credit. 245 Barry and Irujo had established a business partnership
in 1797, and they were able to keep close ties as Irujo married into a distinguished Pennsylvania
family 246 where he lived nearby Barry in Baltimore. 247
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In June of 1798 during the time of Barry’s involvement with the tobacco shipments at
issue in Manella, Barry was active in Baltimore’s maritime business. In preparation for the
Quasi-War with France, Barry was selected by his peers with four other merchants in Baltimore
to raise funds to build a Ship of War out of Baltimore. 248 They raised over $100,000 which
financed the construction of two ships. 249 The ships were built in Fell’s Point, where Barry
owned a wharf and the Baltimore clippers were built. 250 In 1800, Barry formed a Baltimore
based firm for maritime commerce. 251 Years later in 1807, Thomas Kemp built a ship for Barry
in Fell’s Point. 252 Barry likely intended this firm to have a grain store in Baltimore in
partnership with Thomas Law’s agency house from his East India Trading commissions. 253
Barry’s relationship with Law began when they lived in East India where they congregated with
other foreign born merchants. 254 Barry and Law also incorporated the Washington Canal
Company with funds they raised beginning in 1803, which became a considerable and respected
business. 255
Following the conflict with Manella, Barry continued to engage in the tobacco trade in
Spain. In February of 1799, there was a glut of royal tobacco in Venezuela that needed to be
sold to foreign neutrals in order to garner a profit for the royal monopoly which controlled
Venezuelan tobacco. In April of that year, Spanish-American ports were closed to neutrals, and
Venezuelan tobacco seller Fernández de León sought help from Casa Irujo, Spanish Minister to
the United States, to find Americans willing to transport and sell the Spanish tobacco in Holland.
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James Barry agreed to do this, and transported a portion of the excess tobacco to Holland on his
ship, the Fly. This meant that Barry had to carry false papers and lie about the ownership of the
tobacco if captured by British privateers. 256 Barry did the same in 1797 when he shipped royal
tobacco on the brig Paramaribo from Baltimore to Cádiz. 257 The ship was stopped by a British
blockade, and went to the port of Málaga where it was captured by a French privateer. 258
Beyond his career in the maritime shipping business, Barry was also active politically as
a member of the Federalist party. 259 A bipartisan group elected Barry as President of the First
Chamber in the first Washington D.C. local election on May 3, 1802. 260 Barry was elected again
at the third election in 1804. 261 Barry declined to serve as a member of the City Council because
he was frequently away from the city, both in Baltimore and New York. 262 Barry was also
elected to the board of trustees of the Public Schools in 1905, but declined to serve for the same
reason. 263
In 1800, Barry moved to Washington, and in 1805 to New York where he lived until his
death in 1808. 264 He appears in New York City directories from 1805 – 1808 as Consul for
Maryland and Virginia at Washington, merchant, and Consul for Portugal for the east States and
New York. 265 The N.Y. Evening Post published notice of Barry’s death on Jan. 7, 1808 from a
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lingering illness due to influenza and tuberculosis caused by stagnant waters in Washington, an
illness which also took Joanna and James’ daughter Mary. 266
The Barry homes in Baltimore and Washington have a storied history. In Baltimore,
Patapsco tax records show Barry living in a simple home on Homewood between 1798 and 1801,
now the site of Johns Hopkins Homewood Campus. Barry conveyed his Homewood property
consisting of half of Merryman’s Lot to Charles Carroll on February 12, 1801 after he and his
family moved to Washington. 267 There the Barry family resided at 1321 Third Street, S.E. which
the Barrys put up for sale in 1802 when they moved to New York. 268 The proceeds from this
sale comprised Barry’s estate which he bequeathed to his wife Joanna upon his death. Acting in
the strong Catholic faith of the Barry family, Joanna gave $2,000 to St. Mary’s Church which
became Barry’s Chapel at the intersection of One-Half and P Street, S.W. in Washington. 269
Barry and his daughters Ann and Mary were buried beneath the chapel. 270 “Many historians . . .
assert that Barry Chapel . . . was the first edifice erected for Catholic worship in the City of
Washington.” 271 Barry’s estate also included seven family portraits by the famous painter
Gilbert Stuart. 272
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